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1 Introduction
The traditional law and economics literature argues that laws inuence individual
behavior because the rules of behavior (`obligations') that they specify are backed by
deterrent incentives (see e.g. Becker, 1968, Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). In many
cases, incentives attached to obligations are however weak or missing altogether, while
the conformity with the obligations is surprisingly high. For example, not casting
one's vote, abortion, or the possession of small amounts of cannabis are unlawful, but
not chargeable in several countries.1 Moreover, despite low detection probabilities for
tax evasion behavior, observed levels of tax compliance tend to be high and dwarf
theoretically predicted levels (see e.g. Andreoni et al., 1998). To provide a further
example, Fisman and Miguel (2006) report that although diplomats cannot be ned
for parking violations in New York city, they show a certain degree of law-adherence.
Taken together, these examples suggest that deterrence may not capture all chan-
nels through which laws aect individual behavior. In fact, recent years have seen a
growing interest in the question whether, in addition to deterrence, laws also have a
purely expressive function and aect individual behavior even if they are not backed
by (binding) incentives. Empirical studies on an expressive function of law are scarce
though and yield mixed results. Our paper adds to this literature by presenting a
laboratory experiment which is designed to test for an expressive function of law and
to assess how and under which circumstances expressive law works.
Our experiment design builds on Galbiato and Vertova (2008a). We run a standard
repeated public good game which is augmented by an exogenously imposed obligation
to make a minimum contribution to the public good. Despite this obligation subjects
can contribute any integer amount of their initial endowment, i.e., also more or less than
1Examples for countries with compulsory voting that is not enforced are Argentina, Belgium, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Italy, Luxemburg, Mexico, Paraguay, The
Philippines, and Venezuela. Under certain circumstances, abortion is unlawful, but not chargeable in
Germany, Switzerland, and Brasil. In Brasil, Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal possession of
small amounts of Cannabis is illegal but not ned.
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the minimum contribution. To increase the salience of the obligation, we use a system
of very weak, probabilistic incentives. In dierent treatments, we keep the intensity
of marginal incentives constant, but vary level and symmetry of obligations across
subjects. Similar to Galbiato and Vertova (2008a, 2008b), our analysis investigates
the eects of symmetric high and low minimum contributions of 80% and 20% of the
initial endowment in situations in which the subjects face identical obligations. While
dierent contribution levels in these treatments point to an expressive functions of
law, a compliance with symmetric obligations may partly reect considerations driven
by internalized social norms. To account for this, our analysis, unlike previous work,
uses treatments with asymmetric obligations. Asymmetric obligations for symmetric
individuals very likely do not coincide with internalized norms and may therefore better
represent the `pure behavioral response' to externally imposed obligations.
Our results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law. In the symmetric
treatments, subjects with high obligations contribute signicantly more than subjects
with low obligations during the rst periods of the game. However, in our repeated
game setup with frequent feedback on partner behavior, the eect of high obligations
becomes weaker over time and is not strong enough to sustain high levels of cooperation
in later periods of the game. Furthermore, we nd that, conditional on a given own
obligation, public good contributions do not dier between symmetric and asymmetric
treatments - also for the initial periods of the game when obligations have a strong
impact on behavior. This result implies that asymmetric obligations are as eective as
symmetric ones in inuencing individual contribution behavior.
Theoretical contributions suggest that an expressive function of law may be related
to two channels: First, laws may create a focal point. In settings with multiple equilib-
ria, they can act as a coordination device by changing beliefs on others' behavior and
tipping the system towards a new equilibrium (Cooter, 1998). Second, laws prescribe
what ought to be done. Consequently, they may attach a non-monetary, emotional cost
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to the forbidden acts such as a loss in self-esteem (Benabou and Tirole, 2008).2 Our
results provide some evidence for the importance of the latter channel. For example,
we nd that, in later periods of the repeated public good game, individuals with a high
obligation (of 80% of their endowment) are signicantly more likely to make very small
public good contributions below 20% of their endowments than individuals who face a
low obligation of 20% of their endowment. This is in line with the notion that subjects
trade o a xed emotional cost of disobeying an obligation with a monetary gain from
disobeying.
Our paper contributes to a small empirical literature on expressive law which yields
mixed results: Galbiato and Vertova (2008a, 2008b) provide experimental evidence
in favor of an expressive function of law. They show that introducing weakly incen-
tivized symmetric and exogenous minimum contribution levels in a repeated standard
public good game signicantly aects average contribution levels. Similarly, Falk et
al. (2006) show that non-binding wage guidelines strongly aect reservation wages of
workers and wage oers by employers. In contrast, Feld and Tyran (2006) do not nd a
signicant eect of exogenously imposed minimum contribution levels in a public good
experiment.3
Galbiato and Vertova (2008b) and Bohnet and Cooter (2005) explore the channels
via which expressive law may work. Galbiato and Vertova (2008b) explicitly elicit sub-
jects' beliefs on others' contribution levels in treatments without and with varying levels
of symmetric obligations. They nd that a subject's belief on other players' contribu-
tion level is inuenced by other players' levels of obligation. Introducing treatments
with asymmetric obligations, our design extends their approach by measuring whether
a subject's behavior changes for a given own obligation if the other player's obligation
changes. Bohnet and Cooter (2005) use dierent experimental games that both have a
2Similarly, among others Cooter (1998), Huck (1998), and Bar-Gill and Fershtman (2004) suggest
that laws might directly change preferences.
3Focusing on the related aspect of social norm activation, Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003) and
Tyran and Feld (2006) show that obligations which are endogenously implemented through a voting
mechanism do aect average individual contribution levels.
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unique best strategy for selsh players to investigate whether expressive law `changes
preferences' by comparing behavior in neutrally and morally framed treatments. Ad-
ditionally, they analyze behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria to
test whether expressive law acts as a coordination device by changing beliefs on others'
behavior. They only nd an eect of expressive law in the coordination game.
Analyzing eld data Funk (2007, 2010) shows that abolishing the voting duty in
Swiss Cantons signicantly reduced voter turnout in Cantons where the obligation to
vote was backed by a symbolic ne, while the introduction of postal voting (and the
associated change in voting costs) did not induce a signicant behavioral eect.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 explains the experiment
design, section 3 derives the hypotheses. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 Experiment Design
Game and treatments
The provision of public goods is one prominent area in which obligations established
by law are often used aiming at enhancing eciency (think about taxation or voting
duties, for example). Our design reects that obligations usually occur in repeated
interactions of a given group of subjects who receive feedback on each other's behavior.
We build on the standard workhorse to analyze decision making in the presence of
public goods, the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) game. We dene groups
of two subjects i, with i 2 fA;Bg. A group size of two allows for an especially strong
contrast of dierent levels of obligations in the asymmetric treatments. The roles of
players A and B are randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment and remain
unchanged throughout the experiment. The composition of each group is held constant
during the whole experiment (partner matching) and subjects know that. In each of 10
periods, subjects are endowed with 100 experimental currency units (ECU) and have
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to decide how many units to contribute to a common group project and how much to
keep for themselves. Contrary to a standard VCM game and following Galbiato and
Vertova (2008a), obligations are imposed externally: the experimental instructions
state that `there is a minimum contribution that each participant is obliged to give' to
the `common project'.4 The level of the required minimum contribution varies across
treatments, but is held constant over the 10 periods of a given treatment. Since we are
interested in the eects of obligations per se, we keep the marginal incentives (i.e. the
probability of a control and the associated incentive system) xed across all treatments,
while the level of the minimum contribution required by obligation changes between
treatments. In the rst treatment, both players face a minimum contribution of 80
ECU (i.e. 80% of the individual endowment). In the second treatment, player A faces
a minimum contribution level of 80 ECU, while player B faces a minimum contribution
of 20 ECU. In the third treatment, both players face a minimum contribution of 20
ECU. In the following, we will refer to the treatments as `80-80 treatment', `80-20
treatment', and `20-20 treatment', respectively.
Despite the minimum contribution the experimental instructions clarify that `the
participants' actual contributions to the common project can be any integer between
0 and 100 and, thus, can dier from the minimum contributions.' Hence a subject's
actual contribution may deviate upwards and downwards from her minimum contri-
bution. To increase the salience of the obligation, we use weak incentives that are
not expected to inuence a risk neutral or moderately risk-averse subject's behavior.5
Precisely, we implement a monitoring system where each subject is controlled with a
4The concept of a legal obligation is related to, but diers from the concept of social norms that
are dened as customary rules of behavior that coordinate our interactions with others (Young, 2008).
While social norms arise endogenously and evolutionary in a given society, in our framework obligations
basically appear from nowhere and the required rules of behavior might, but need not coincide with
social norms.
5Galbiato and Vertova (2008b) show that the eects of obligations that are not underlined by any
incentives at all are too weak to signicantly inuence individual behavior. Similarly, Funk (2007)
nds that the abolition of the voting duty signicantly reduces voter turnout only in those Cantons
in which not casting one's vote was subject to a symbolic ne.
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probability of 1=12.6 If the controlled subject's actual contribution falls short of her
minimum contribution, she is subject to a ne payment equal to 1:2 (oi   ci), where
oi   ci depicts the dierence between the subject's minimum contribution oi and her
actual contribution ci. To ensure constant marginal incentives for contributing, if the
actual contribution of the controlled subject exceeds her minimum contribution, she is
subject to a reward payment equal to  1:2 (oi  ci). No penalty or reward is assigned
to a monitored subject whose actual contribution is exactly equal to the minimum
contribution set up by the obligation. In each period, the expected monetary payo
Xi of subject i is
Xi = 100  ci + 0:6  (ci + cj)  1
12
 1:2  (oi   ci); i; j 2 fA;Bg ; i 6= j (1)
where ci (cj) indicates the contribution of subject i (the matched subject j) to the public
good. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the public good is 0:6. Note that
the parameters are chosen such that the expected aggregate payo is maximized if each
individual fully cooperates. Formally,
@(Xi +Xj)
@ci
=  1 + 2  0:6 + 0:1 > 0; i; j 2 fA;Bg ; i 6= j (2)
Implementation of the experiment
All seven sessions were held in the computerized laboratory of the University of Bonn
(BonnEconLab) in July 2010 using the software zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total,
156 subjects took part in the experiment: 44 in the `80-80 treatment' (2 sessions),
66 in the `80-20 treatment' (3 sessions) and 46 in the `20-20 treatment' (2 sessions).
Subjects were university students from dierent elds who were recruited using the
software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each subject took part in only one session.
In each session subjects were welcomed and randomly assigned a cubicle in the labo-
6As the instructions that are attached in Appendix B illustrate, we took great care in ensuring
that our subjects had an adequate understanding of a probability of 1=12.
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ratory where they took their decisions in complete anonymity from the other subjects.
Subjects received the instructions and answered several computerized control questions
that tested their understanding of the decision situation. Only after providing and ex-
plaining the right answers on the computer screen, we proceeded to the decision stage.
Translated sample experiment instructions as they were handed out to players B in
the asymmetric `80-20 treatment' are attached in Appendix B. Analogous instructions
were handed out in the other treatments which diered only in the stated minimum
contributions. In all treatments, payo functions and both players' minimum contribu-
tions were common knowledge. After each period, subjects received feedback regarding
their own and the other player's actual contributions, the overall contributions to the
public good, whether one of the players had been controlled and their own and the
other player's payo. After 10 periods we nished each experimental session by asking
subjects to answer a brief questionnaire on their risk attitude and socio-demographic
characteristics. To assess individual risk preferences subjects were confronted with
incentivized decisions between lotteries and sure payos inspired by Holt and Laury
(2002).
A session lasted roughly 90 minutes. Average earnings were about 19 Euros (about
25 US dollars), comprising a show-up fee of 4 Euros, the payo from a randomly drawn
period in the VCM game, the payo from the risk attitude decisions, and the payo
from a further experiment that was only announced after the end of the VCM game
and is not analyzed in the course of this paper.
3 Hypotheses
We will rst compare behavior in the treatments with low and high symmetric obliga-
tions, the `80-80 treatment' and the `20-20 treatment'. As the previous literature, we
take this as a test for whether there is an expressive function of law: we nd arma-
tive evidence if subjects in the `80-80 treatment' contribute more than subjects in the
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`20-20 treatment'.
Hypothesis 1: There is an expressive function of law, i.e. the level of weakly incentivized
obligations does aect contribution levels.
The standard economic model predicts that obligations do not aect the behavior
of a self-interested, risk neutral, and monetary payo maximizing individual since the
expected individual return from contributing to the public good is negative:
@Xi
@ci
=  1 + 0:6 + 0:1 < 0; i 2 fA;Bg (3)
The monetary incentives attached to the obligation are too weak to make contributing
to the public good protable. Consequently, the dominant strategy is full free-riding,
a contribution of ci = 0.
In contrast, a growing theoretical literature on an expressive function of law suggests
that obligations may aect individual behavior even if they are not backed by any or
only weak extrinsic incentives (see e.g. Cooter, 1998, Benabou and Tirole, 2008).
When preferences that deviate from pure monetary payo maximization are taken into
account, the level of obligation may aect contributions in a VCM game.
If we nd evidence in favor of an expressive function of law, we will proceed by
comparing behavior of subjects with the same level of obligation, but dierent levels
of the partner's obligation, e.g. behavior of subjects with an obligation of 80 in the
`80-20 treatment' and all subjects in the `80-80 treatment'.
Hypothesis 2: Individual contribution levels are not only aected by the own obligation,
but also by the obligation of the partner, i.e. for a given own obligation, individuals
contribute dierent amounts in the symmetric and the asymmetric treatment.
If we can reject Hypothesis 2, we nd that asymmetric obligations are as eective
as symmetric ones. Comparing symmetric and asymmetric treatments may provide
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some hints at how expressive law might work. Essentially the literature proposes two
channels through which obligations may aect behavior: First, according to Cooter
(1998) if there are multiple equilibria, obligations may serve as a focal point or co-
ordination device as they aect individual beliefs about the contributions of others.7
It is well-known from the experimental literature on VCM games that a fraction of
individuals make positive contributions to the public good even in the absence of obli-
gations. This is generally explained by the idea that these individuals have `fairness
preferences' for processes or outcomes: they are, for example, conditional cooperators
(e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001) or inequality averse (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
If suciently many individuals have `fairness preferences', the VCM game may have
multiple equilibria. Let us assume that for a given own obligation, the belief of an indi-
vidual with `fairness preferences' on the partner's contribution changes if the partner's
obligation changes. We would expect that such an individual will contribute dierent
amounts in the symmetric and the asymmetric treatment.
Second, facing an obligation, individuals may incur a non-monetary, emotional cost
when disobeying the obligation. A cost of disobeying is in line with Benabou and
Tirole's (2008) general model of prosocial behavior. According to them, prosocial
behavior is driven by intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and reputational con-
cerns, i.e. a concern for social or self-esteem.8 In our setup obligations can have two
eects: they will induce high salience of what is considered the appropriate behav-
ior (namely, obeying the own obligation). Thus, obligations may increase the weight
attached to self-esteem concerns.9 Furthermore, not obeying the own obligation may
cause a cost, namely a loss in self-esteem. If obligations aect behavior by introducing
7In a setup with symmetric obligations, Galbiato and Vertova (2008b) show empirically that obli-
gations indeed aect beliefs on others' behavior. We did not elicit beliefs in our experiment.
8In our design with very weak incentives extrinsic motivation is negligible (as our data will docu-
ment). In Benabou and Tirole's (2008) model, intrinsic motivation is unaected by the introduction
of obligations per se. Furthermore, due to anonymity striving for social esteem cannot inuence
behavior.
9In this spirit, a cost of disobeying can also be considered to be one specic illustration for Cooter's
(1998) argument that expressive law may shape individual preferences. See also Huck (1998) and Bar-
Gill and Fershtman (2004).
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a cost of disobeying the own obligation, we would expect individual contributions to be
aected by the own, but not by the partner's obligation. Consequently, for a given own
obligation, we do not expect behavior to dier in the symmetric and the asymmetric
treatment.
4 Results
We will rst investigate behavior in the treatments with symmetric obligations and then
proceed to analyzing behavior with asymmetric obligations. Appendix A documents
that risk preferences do not inuence contribution levels given the weak probabilistic
incentive system that we use to underline the salience of obligations. Consequently, we
can safely abstract from risk preferences in the analysis that follows.
Behavior with symmetric obligations
Figure 1 reports the time series of pairwise contributions from period 1 to 10 for the two
symmetric treatments. Pairwise contributions dier substantially between treatments
in the rst period, with an average of 150 ECU in the `80-80 treatment' and an average
of 106 ECU in the `20-20 treatment'. Figure 1 moreover suggests that cooperation
levels decline in subsequent periods in the `80-80 treatment', resulting in an average
contribution of 117 ECU over period 1 to 10. In contrast, contributions in the `20-20
treatment' are rather stable over time. The average pairwise contribution in period 1
to 10 is 103 ECU. The dierent time trends imply a convergence of contributions in
the two treatments in later periods of the experiment.
A Mann-Whitney test on the dierence in pairwise contribution levels between treat-
ments in period 1 shows that contributions to the public good are signicantly larger
in the high obligation treatments (p=0.004).10 In line with Figure 1, the dierences
in pairwise contribution levels across treatments decrease over time and eventually be-
10Throughout the paper, we report two sided p-values.
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come insignicant. A Mann-Whitney test using pairwise contributions averaged over
periods 1 to 10 yields p=0.440.
In sum, these results provide evidence for the existence of a weak expressive function
of law: contribution patterns dier between treatments although treatments dier by
very weakly incentivized obligations only. The eects of obligations are, however,
weak. Our results suggest that obligations are instrumental in shaping behavior in
the rst period, but their eect on contributions tends to decrease over time.11 Thus,
to some extent, our results dier from the ndings of Galbiato and Vertova (2008a)
which suggest not only an initial, but a sustained eect of obligations on behavior in
a repeated VCM game.
Result 1: We nd evidence for a weak expressive function of law. In the rst period,
subjects with high obligations contribute signicantly more to the public good than
subjects with low obligations, but contribution levels of subjects with low and high
obligations converge over time.
Behavior with asymmetric obligations
We proceed by investigating whether, for a given individual obligation, behavior diers
between symmetric and asymmetric treatments. Figure 2 depicts the average individ-
ual contributions of subjects in the `80-80 treatment' and the `20-20 treatment'. In
the asymmetric `80-20 treatment', it distinguishes between players A and B who face
an obligation of 80 and 20 ECU, respectively. Figure 2 clearly suggests that individual
contributions are aected by the own obligation, but seem to be independent from
the partner's obligation. Average contribution levels of subjects with an obligation of
80 ECU are, for example, virtually identical in the `80-80 treatment' and the `80-20
treatment' (75 versus 74.5 ECU in the rst period with a similar decline over time).
Furthermore, contribution levels of subjects with an obligation of 20 are similar in
11Note that since our subjects receive feedback on actual partner behavior, it is plausible to assume
that, when forming beliefs, subjects will mainly rely on obligations of their partner in the rst period
and on feedback on actual behavior of the partner in later periods.
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size (53 in the `20-20 treatment' versus 46 in the `80-20 treatment' in the rst pe-
riod) and stable over time for both subjects in the `20-20 treatment' and the `80-20
treatment'. The Mann-Whitney tests in Table 1 conrm that there are no signicant
dierences in contribution levels between symmetric and asymmetric treatments for a
given individual obligation.
Table 2 displays estimates of a random eects model using the individual contri-
butions per period as dependent variable which allows discriminating between the
contribution levels of subjects with low and high obligations in the asymmetric `80-20
treatment'.12 Individual contributions are explained by dummy variables indicating
the dierent treatments (in the `80-20 treatment' we use an interaction to dierentiate
between player types), a linear time trend (`Period'), and a dummy variable `Period
10' to capture potential end game eects. To be able to test whether time trend and
end game eects dier between treatments (as suggested by Figure 1 and 2) we al-
low time trend and end game eect to vary between treatments and, in the `80-20
treatment', by player type. In line with the descriptive and test results above, the
estimation results in Table 2 show that individual contribution levels are aected by
the own obligation, but are independent from the partner's obligation: The dummy
for the `80-20 treatment' that captures behavior of players B is not signicant when
compared to the `20-20 treatment' (the baseline) and a t-test for equality of coecients
of player As' contributions in the `80-20 treatment' and all players' contributions in
the `80-80 treatment' yields p=0.381. Thus, for a given own obligation, behavior is
indistinguishable in treatments with symmetric and asymmetric obligations.
Result 2: Individual contribution levels are only aected by the own obligation, but
not by the partner's obligation.
12The rationale for presenting the results of an OLS model, instead of Tobit, is that the former
allows clustering the standard errors at the level of subject pairs. This is important not to treat
individual contributions within a pair as independent, i.e. to allow for correlations in the behavior
at the pair level over time. Estimating a random eects Tobit model derives similar results, though,
which are available from the authors upon request.
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Moreover, Table 2 reveals that subjects with an obligation of 20 ECU contribute more
than they are obliged. Precisely, we nd that they make average contributions of about
50 ECU in both the `80-20 treatment' and the `20-20 treatment'. These contribution
rates are comparable to initial contributions in VCM games without obligations and
to contributions in treatments with an obligation of zero for a design with the same
weak incentive structure as our design (see Galbiato and Vertova, 2008a). Thus, on
average individuals appear to stick to their initially preferred contribution level even
if their obligation falls short of it.
Furthermore, in line with the results presented in the previous section, Table 2
documents a statistically signicant decline in the level of contributions across periods
for individuals with a high obligation only (both in the `80-80 treatment' and in the
`80-20 treatment').
Finally, all results from Table 2 are robust to adding a dummy variable that indi-
cates whether a subject has been controlled in the previous period. The corresponding
coecient is negative and not signicant at the 5% level (p=0.096).
Discussion of results
Result 2 implies that asymmetric obligations are equally eective as symmetric ones.
Even non-binding asymmetric obligations for symmetric subjects who very likely do
not coincide with internalized norms do aect behavior in the initial periods of the
game. Figure 3 reports the fraction of subjects who undercut their obligation in a
given period by treatment and, in the `80-20 treatment', by player type. Again, the
gure suggests that the probability of undercutting the own obligation is in the rst
place determined by the subject's own obligation and independent from the partner's
obligation. The fraction of non-complying subjects is higher for subjects who face a
high obligation compared to subjects who face a low obligation (roughly 30% versus
10% of the subjects in the rst period). In line with declining levels of cooperation
over time, the fraction of subjects who undercut their obligation increases over time.
13
Furthermore, Result 2 is compatible with the notion that subject incur non-monetary
costs when disobeying an obligation as, for example, a loss in self-esteem as proposed
in the model of prosocial behavior by Benabou and Tirole (2008). One particular test
to assess this argument is to compare the probability of subjects with the high and low
obligation to contribute less than 20 ECU to the public good. In general, this is relevant
for later periods of the repeated game only, as contribution levels at the beginning of the
game tend to be signicantly higher than 20 ECU in all treatments. If there is a cost of
disobeying the obligation, low obligations may help to stabilize subjects' contributions
to the public good in later periods of the game since subjects with a low obligation can
save the emotional cost of disobeying by foregoing a relatively small monetary gain.
Subjects with the high obligation, however, may not only be more likely to disobey
their obligation, but also, once they have undercut their high obligation of 80, more
willing to undercut the 20 ECU threshold than individuals with an obligation of 20
ECU.
The left panel of Figure 4 suggests that, in period 10, around 50% of the subjects
with an obligation of 80 ECU make contributions below 20 ECU. This holds irrespective
of whether the partner faces the same obligation in the `80-80 treatment' or a lower
obligation in the `80-20 treatment'. Subjects with an obligation of 20 ECU, in turn,
have a signicantly lower probability to contribute less than 20 ECU in period 10
(around 30%). A similar, although somewhat weaker, picture emerges if we consider
periods 5 to 10 (see the right panel of Figure 4). A Fisher exact test that compares
all subjects with an obligation of 20 to all subjects with an obligation of 80 documents
that the share of subjects who contribute less than 20 diers signicantly across the
two groups in period 10 (p=0.015).
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5 Conclusion
Despite a rising interest in the question whether there is an expressive function of law,
empirical evidence on the topic is still scarce und yields ambiguous results. Our results
conrm that obligations expressed by law aect behavior even in the absence of binding
deterrent incentives - the eect is relatively weak, though. We exploit the dierence
between setups with symmetric and asymmetric obligations to shed some light on how
and under which circumstances expressive law might work. Our results suggest that,
for a given own obligation, individual behavior does not dier between treatments
with symmetric and asymmetric obligations. Put dierently, while the subjects' own
obligations are found to inuence individual behavior, the obligations of others do not.
This nding is compatible with the notion that obligations aect individual behavior
by inducing an emotional cost of disobeying an obligation.
Several policy implications emerge from the analysis. First, as we nd that obliga-
tions can to some extent channel individual behavior, in some situations, policy makers
may nd it attractive to rely on obligations to avoid costly deterrent incentives. Fur-
thermore, using obligations instead of deterrent incentives may prevent crowding out
of intrinsic motivation to behave prosocially, a phenomenon that has found lots of at-
tention in recent years (for survey studies see Frey and Jegen, 2001 as well as Fehr and
Falk, 2002).
Second, our analysis suggests that the eects of obligations are subtle and need
further study. For example, dierent levels of obligations may induce dierent dynamics
over time. High obligations seem to be a good tool to induce high cooperation levels
in one-shot situations or in the earlier periods of repeated games. In contrast, low
obligations can be helpful in stabilizing cooperation at lower levels in the long run
and, thus, prevent a complete breakdown of cooperation in later periods of a repeated
interaction.
Finally, the power of obligations as policy tool is not restricted to imposing the same
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obligation on everybody. Even with homogeneous individuals, asymmetric obligations
seem to be as eective as symmetric one.
16
Appendix A - The Role of Risk Preferences
To underline the salience of obligations, we have chosen an experiment design in which
deviations from obligations trigger a weak probabilistic incentive system. Consequently,
despite incentives being very weak, individual risk preferences might aect individual
contribution levels. In particular, risk averse individuals might contribute closer to the
minimum contribution required by obligation because they prefer to insure themselves.
Whether this is indeed the case is an empirical question.
To single out subjects' risk preferences we use a procedure similar to Holt and Laury
(2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011). Subjects are asked to make ve choices between an
option A and an option B that are reported in Table A1a. Option A is constant across
choices and involves a lottery where subjects win 6 Euros with a probability of 50% and
0 Euros with a probability of 50%. Option B is a secure payment (with a probability
of 100%) that varies across choices being 1 Euro in choice 1, 2 Euros in choice 2, 3
Euros in choice 3 and so on. Once all subjects have taken all ve choices, one choice is
randomly chosen and the computer assigns to each subject the option she has chosen
before. Finally, the lottery is run in order to determine payos of those subjects who
have chosen the lottery option A. Stakes in Table A1a are similar to those in the VCM
game. In Table A1b, we classify individual risk preferences in ve categories (highly
risk loving, risk loving, risk neutral, risk averse, highly risk averse) according to the
sequence of choices taken in Table A1a. Table A1b suggests that 88% of the subjects
are risk neutral.
In Table A1c, we also test explicitly whether risk preferences aect the deviation of
contributions from obligations. In specication (1), a random eects Tobit model esti-
mates the impact of the risk type on the per period deviation of individual contributions
from individual obligation. None of the coecient estimates gains statistical signi-
cance suggesting that risk preferences do not determine individual behavior. This is
conrmed in specication (2) which additionally controls for a time trend and includes
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a dummy for period 10 to capture possible end game eects.
Thus, in line with expectations, the weak incentive system does not induce an eect of
risk-preferences on contribution levels. Together with the high fraction of risk-neutral
subjects, this result suggests that we can safely abstract from risk preferences in our
main analysis.
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Appendix B - Instructions
General explanations concerning the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. You are taking part in an economic experiment funded by the German
Research Foundation. You and other participants are asked to make decisions. Your decisions as
well as the other participants' decisions determine the outcome of the experiment. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid in cash according to the actual result. So please read the instructions
thoroughly and think about your decisions carefully.
Independent of the outcome of the experiment each participant will receive an additional amount of
4 Euros.
During the experiment we will talk about taler instead of Euros. Your total income will be calculated
in taler rst. At the end of the experiment your total amount of taler will be converted into Euro:
20 taler = 1 Euros.
During the whole experiment it is not allowed to talk to the other participants, to use cell phones,
to listen to music, or to launch any programs on the computer. The neglect of these rules will lead
to the exclusion from the experiment and from all payments. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand. One of the experimenters will then come to your seat to answer your questions.
In the following paragraphs we will describe the exact experimental procedure. At the end of this
introductory information we will ask you to answer some questions that will be helpful to become
familiar with the decision task.
The experiment
At the beginning of the experiment all participants are randomly divided into groups of two persons.
Neither before nor after the experiment you and the other participant in your group will receive any
information on the matched participant. The experiment consists of 10 periods. In all 10 periods, you
and the same other participant will form a group.
From now on we will call the participants in each group participant A and participant B. Both partici-
pant A and B are endowed with 100 taler at the beginning of each period. In the following the general
conditions dier for participant A and B. You have been randomly selected to be participant A.
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Overview of the experiment
Participant A and participant B contribute to a common project. Both participants can contribute
any whole number between 0 and 100 taler to the common project. Both participants have been
assigned a minimum amount that they are obliged to contribute to the common project. There is
a control system. If you are controlled and you have contributed less (more) than your minimum
contribution, your payo is reduced (increased).
The common project
In each of the 10 periods participants A and B have to decide, how many of their 100 taler to contribute
to the common project. Participants keep all taler that they did not contribute to the common project
for themselves. At the end of the experiment, participants are paid out the taler they have kept.
The contributions to the common project of participant A and B are added, multiplied by 1.2 and
nally shared equally between both participants. Thus, both participants receive the same individual
payo from the common project:
Individual payo from the common project
= (contribution of A + contribution of B)  1.2/2
= (contribution of A + contribution of B)  0.6
Example: Both A and B contribute 90 taler to the common project. The individual payo of A and B
is 90  0:6 = 54, respectively.
So your contribution to the common project increases the payo of the other participant in your
group. Your payo also increases if the other participant contributes more to the common project.
For every token that one participant contributes both participants earn 0.6 taler. Consequently, the
total payo of participant A and B from the common project is 20% (= 1:2 = 2  0:6) higher than the
contributions of participant A and B.
Minimum contribution to the common project
Every participant has to decide how many of his 100 taler he would like to contribute to the common
project. In each period there is a minimum contribution that each participant is obliged to give.
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 Participant A is obliged to contribute at least 80 taler to the common project.
 Participant B is obliged to contribute at least 20 taler to the common project.
The demanded minimum contributions of the participants do not change over the 10 periods.
The control system
The participants' actual contributions to the common project can be any integer between 0 and
100 and thus can dier from the minimum contributions. In every period there is a chance that a
participant's contribution to the common project is being controlled. First the computer randomly
selects a number between 1 and 6 (as if throwing a dice). The participant is not controlled if the
number is 2,3,4,5 or 6. If the number is 1, the computer again selects a random number between 1
and 6. If the number in this second step is even, the participant is controlled. If the number is odd,
the participant is not controlled. Thus, the probability of being controlled is equal to 1/6*1/2=1/12,
i.e. about 8.3% for each participant.
The control system remains the same in every period. A control in a certain period does not inuence
the probability of control in a future period.
What is the eect of a control?
 If the participant being controlled has exactly contributed the demanded minimum contribu-
tion, the control has no eect on his payo.
 If the participant being controlled has contributed less than the demanded minimum contribu-
tion, 1.2 taler will be deducted from his payo for each token he has contributed less than his
minimum contribution.
 If the participant being controlled has contributed more than the demanded minimum contri-
bution, 1.2 taler will be added to his payo for each token he has contributed more than his
minimum contribution.
Example: Assume the minimum contribution of a participant is 50 taler. The participant contributes
30 taler to the common project. If this participant is controlled (with probability of 1/12), his payo
will be reduced by 1:2 (minimum contribution - actual contribution) = 1.2 (50  30) = 24 taler.
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Example: Assume the minimum contribution of the participant is 50 taler. The participant contributes
70 taler to the common project. If this participant is controlled (with a probability of 1/12), his payo
will be increased by 1:2 (actual contribution - minimum contribution) = 1.2 (70  50) = 24 taler.
Your decision on the computer
On the computer there is a decision screen for your choice how many of your 100 taler to contribute
to the common project.
The screen shows the minimum contribution to the common project that is demanded from you.
There is an input box in which you have to enter the amount you have chosen to contribute to the
common project (every contribution between 0 and 100 is possible). Please press the OK-Button after
you have made your decision how much you would like to contribute to the common project.
Feedback at the end of each period
At the end of each period there is a computer screen showing all results: for both participants
 their minimum contribution
 how many taler they have contributed to the common project
 whether they were controlled
 the total payo of this period
If you have taken notice of all results, please press the OK-Button.
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly chooses one of the ten periods whose result will
be paid to both participants of your group.
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Appendix C - Figures and Tables
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Figure 1: Time Series Pairwise Contributions
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Figure 2: Time Series Individual Contributions
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Figure 3: Time Series Fraction of Individuals Undercutting their Obligation
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Figure 4: Fraction of Individuals Contributing less than 20 ECU
Table 1: Mann-Whitney Rank-Sum Tests
Dierence in Individual Contributions (two sided p-values)
Period 1 Period 1-10
all players in 20-20 Treatment versus Player B in 80-20 Treatment 0.356 0.334
all players in 80-80 Treatment versus Player A in 80-20 Treatment 0.430 0.738
Table 2: Individual Contributions per Period
Random Eects OLS Model, Periods 1-10
Treatment 80-80 17.31
(8.179)
Treatment 80-20 -5.21
(7.033)
Treatment 80-20Player A 25.74
(5.066)
PeriodTreatment 20-20 -0.65
(0.726)
PeriodTreatment 80-80 -2.50
(0.766)
PeriodTreatment 80-20 -0.832
(0.630)
PeriodTreatment 80-20Player A -2.64
(0.901)
Period 10Treatment 20-20 -8.67
(6.603)
Period 10Treatment 80-80 -8.82
(7.341)
Period 10Treatment 80-20 -17.38
(5.853)
Period 10Treatment 80-20Player A 8.83
(9.672)
Constant 56.03
(5.378)
# Observations 1,560
, ,  indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Robust standard errors that are clustered at
the pair level are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable is the individual contribution per period.
`Treatment 80-80' depicts a dummy variable which indicates the treatment where both players have an obligation
of 80 ECU, `Treatment 80-20' depicts a dummy variable which indicates the treatment where player A faces an
obligation of 80 ECU while subject B faces a obligation of 20 ECU. `Treatment 80-20Player A' is an interaction
term between the dummy `Treatment 80-20' and a dummy indicating player A. 'Period' depicts a linear time
trend, and `PeriodTreatment 80-80' (`PeriodTreatment 80-20') the interaction of the linear time trend with
the treatment dummies for the corresponding treatments. Analogously, PeriodTreatment 80-20Player A is
a triple interaction between the time trend, a dummy indicating the 80-20 treatment and a dummy indicating
player A. `Period 10' is a dummy variable which indicates the last period of the treatment, the interaction terms
Period 10Treatment 80-80, Period 10Treatment 80-20, Period 10Treatment 80-20Player A are dened
analogously to the `Period'-interactions above.
Table A1a: Paired Lottery Choices
Option A Option B
Choice Probability Payment Probability Payment Probability Payment
1 50% 6 50% 0 100% 1
2 50% 6 50% 0 100% 2
3 50% 6 50% 0 100% 3
4 50% 6 50% 0 100% 4
5 50% 6 50% 0 100% 5
Table A1b: Risk Preferences Associated with Lottery Choices
Sequence of Choice Risk Type # of Individuals
A-A-A-A-A highly risk loving 1
A-A-A-A-B risk loving 3
A-A-A-B-B risk neutral 56
A-A-B-B-B risk neutral 82
A-B-B-B-B risk averse 7
B-B-B-B-B highly risk averse 4
other sequences inconsistent choices 3
Table A1c: Absolute Deviation of Contributions from Obligations
Random Eects Tobit Model, Periods 1-10
Explanatory Variables (1) (2)
Highly Risk Averse -17.51 -17.53
(15.81) (15.82)
Risk Averse -10.89 -10.88
(12.10) (12.10)
Risk Loving 12.73 12.68
(18.79) (18.80)
Highly Risk Loving -16.57 -16.49
(31.29) (31.29)
Period 1.286
(0.304)
Period 10 -1.525
(2.930)
# Observations 1,530 1,530
, ,  indicate signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
`Period' depicts a linear time trend, `Period 10' is a dummy variable which indicates the last period.
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